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Abstract 
 
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has proposed the Trusted Computing (TC) concept. Subsequently, TC 
becomes a common base for many new computing platforms, called Trusted Platform (TP) architecture 
(hardware and software) that, practically, has a built-in trusted hardware component mounted at the 
hardware layer and a corresponding trusted software component installed at the operating system level.  
The trusted hardware component is called Trusted Platform Module (TPM) whose specification has been 
issued by TCG group and it is implemented by the industry as a tamper-resistant integrated circuit. In 
practice, the security of an IT TPM-enabled system relies on the correctness of its mounted TPM. Thus, 
TPM testing is urgently needed to assist in building confidence of the users on the security functionality 
provided by the TPM. This paper presents the state of the art of the modelling methods being used in the 
TPM compliance testing as well as it demonstrates some of the important attacks against TPM. Finally, the 
paper proposes new framework criteria for TPM Testing that aim at increasing the quality of TPM testing.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, software on computing platforms has become 
increasingly complex leading to a large number of potential 
vulnerabilities. Consequently, protecting information technology 
systems through software-based mechanisms has become 
increasingly more unable to solve all security problems there in. To 
mitigate this issue, hardware-based embedded security solutions 
have been used in the information technology industry. Among the 
key advances, Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA), 
which was later replaced by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), 
proposed the Trusted Computing (TC) concept. Subsequently, TC 
became the common base for many new computing platforms, 
called Trusted Platform (TP) architecture that, practically, has a 
built-in trusted hardware component at the physical level and 
corresponding trusted software component at operating system 
level. The trusted hardware component is called Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM) whose specification was issued by the TCG group 
and is implemented by industry as a tamper-resistant integrated 
circuit. TPM is dedicated to performing cryptographic functionality 
and to securely store cryptographic keys and secrets. 
  Since the last couple of years, hundreds of millions of PC 
laptops and desktops have been equipped with TPM chips. In fact, 
there are many different vendors that produce TPM chips, such as 
Atmel, Infineon, Broadcom, Sinosun and 
STMicroelectronics/Winond, and, of course, with different modes 
of implementation. This implies that there is an urgent need to have 
a testing methodology that can help security application developers 
and end-users to verify the compliance of their TPM-enabled 
systems with respect to TCG specifications.1,2 
  Past research works in the area of TPM testing fall into two 
broad categories, namely; compliance testing,2-8 and security 
analysis on the TPM specifications,2,9-15. This paper presents 
several modelling methods which are in the domain of TPM 
compliance testing. Recent efforts show that many TPMs available 
in the market are non-compliant to the TCG specification.2-8. At 
this point, it is worth mentioning that China has its own 
specification and its trusted hardware component is called Trusted 
Cryptography Module (TCM). The TCM chip has been specified 
and manufactured by China. It was concluded that there was a gap 
between the TCM implementations and the Chinese specification.16 
This paper also presents the state of the art of some important 
attacks that have been conducted against the TPM during last years. 
We begin with the modelling methods of TPM specifications in 
section 2. Sub-section 2.1 is the discussion on the informal method 
of TPM compliance testing (with an example). Modelling of TPM 
specification based on FSM and EFSM (with examples) are 
presented in sub-section 2.2 and sub-section 2.3 respectively. 
Section 3 presents the attacks against TPM. This paper is concluded 
with proposing features of a new framework for TPM testing in 
section 4. 
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2.0  MODELLING METHODS OF TPM 
SPECIFICATIONS 
 
There are mainly three methods that have been used in modelling 
the TPM specifications. The TPM testing was first introduced using 
informal method.1,17 On the other hand, next research efforts in 
TPM testing used two formal methods that are based on state 
machine theory namely, Finite State Machine (FSM) and Extended 
Finite State Machine (EFSM).4,5,16 In the next sub-sections a brief 
discussion on the following three methods; informal modelling, 
FSM-based modelling and EFSM-based modelling is presented. 
 
2.1  Informal Modelling 
   
The TPM compliance testing was first introduced using informal 
method in which TPMs from different vendors were evaluated.1,17 
In informal modelling, testing is conducted in two levels and two 
quality dimensions, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1  Compliance testing levels and quality dimensions of TPM  
 
 
  Firstly, the Compliance Testing Levels consists of the 
application level and the protocol level. At the application level, the 
TPM is tested from real application standpoint to test the TPM 
functionality. The protocol level is dedicated to test the TPM's 
commands with respect to the data structures. Secondly, in 
Compliance TPM Testing there are four core quality dimensions 
namely, functionality, reliability, security and performance. 
Nevertheless the conducted informal method, only two quality 
dimensions were considered,1,2 which are functionality and 
reliability. Notably, under the functionality dimension, only a 
function test is conducted. Whereas under the reliability dimension, 
integrity test and stress test are conducted. In this paper, the other 
quality dimensions namely, security and performance are discussed 
in later subsections. 
  Two other aspects of the Compliance TPM testing include, 
“TPM behavior”, which is examined via function test and “TPM 
behavior upon failures” which is examined using the integrity tests. 
Yet another aspect is the stress tests which examine “TPM behavior 
under extreme conditions”.  
  Here, we emphasize and focus on their method of generating 
test cases to test the data structure of TPM’s commands. In order to 
test the data structure of a single command, many test cases are 
needed to test the command parameters. Thus to generate test cases 
for each command, the command execution is modeled as a state 
transition into a return code, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2  TPM command execution model 
It is observed that the number of test cases in compliance testing is 
an issue. To mitigate this issue, the input parameters of the TPM 
commands are categorized into four different categories based on 
input parameters which are described below1,17: 
 
Valid: they are acceptable inputs and allow TPM to correctly and 
successfully process the command. Consequently, the return code 
must be TPM_SUCCESS. 
The following three categories should return code indicating an 
error: 
Illegal (A): these are inacceptable inputs as they have either wrong 
data structure or unspecified values, which are not stated by TPM 
specifications,  
Invalid (B): these are inacceptable inputs as their values are wrong 
or meaningless values. 
Unsupported (C): these are inputs with values stated by TPM 
specifications but not acceptable in the context of the command. 
 
The steps of the integrity tests at the protocol level are as 
follows1,17: 
 
(1) Study in detail the TPM specifications. 
(2) Categorize the TPM commands based on their related TPM 
functionality (Dependency Graph). 
(3) From the Dependency Graph draw the action graph which 
shows the required execution order of the TPM commands for 
successful individual TPM commands execution. 
(4) Define the state(s) at which the command (under test) is 
allowed to execute. 
(5) Define the TPM return code(s) for those state(s) at which the 
command is not allowed to execute. 
(6) Construct a table/graph showing all the command parameters 
after manipulation and the related return codes. Table 1 shows 
TPM_CreateWrapKey as an example. 
(7) Execute all the commands required, indicated by the action 
graph, for the successful command execution.   
(8) Send the command input message with only one manipulated 
parameter to the TPM. 
(9) Compare the return code from the TPM with the expected one 
as stated in the table/graph. 
(10) Repeat step 9 and 10 for each manipulated parameter. 
(11) If all the return codes from the TPM match the expected ones 
then the implementation of the command under test is 
complaint with TPM specification, based on integrity test 
only. 
(12) Repeat step 2 up to step 11 for TPM commands, stated on the 
TPM specifications. 
 
 
  The research work1,17 that used the informal method is 
considered as the founder of TPM compliance testing and has 
contributed valuable knowledge and experience significantly in 
TPM testing. Based on the results of the conducted informal 
method we know that some TPM implementations which are from 
(Infineon, Atmel, and ST STM 19 WP 18) were found to be 
incompliant with TCG specification and have security related bugs. 
However, the method used in determining the compliance was still 
informal16 and, furthermore its generation of test cases was not 
automatic and the test method needs to be reviewed and improved 
so that it becomes more systematic2. 
  It is generally known that manual generation of test cases is 
an expensive, error-prone and time consuming process. Nowadays, 
with the improvement of TPM implementations, the informal 
method and manual generation of test cases might not be so 
effective in dealing with greater number of cases of incompliance 
of TPM implementations.
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Table 1  TPM_CreateWrapKey command and its related TPM’s return codes 
 
STATE Parameter name Input Type Return Code 
S2,S4, S6,S8 
TPM_CreateWrapKey Input Message 
TPM_DISABLED 
S3 TPM_DEACTIVATED 
S5 TPM_NOSRK 
S7 
TPM_DEACTIVATED 
TPM_NOSRK 
S1 
tag 
  A 
TPM_BADTAG 
  B 
paramSize   B 
TPM_BAD_PARAM_SIZE 
ordinal 
  A 
  C   
parentHandle 
  
B 
TPM_INVALID_AUTHHANDLE 
  
TPM_KEYNOTFOUND 
  C 
dataUsageAuth       
dataMigrationAuth       
keyInfo       
ver       
keyUsage 
  A 
TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE 
  C 
keyFlags 
  A 
TPM_BAD_PARAMETER 
  C 
authDataUsage 
  A 
TPM_BAD_PARAMETER 
  C 
algorithmParms 
  A 
TPM_BAD_KEY_PROPERTY 
  
C 
  
TPM_NOTFIPS 
  algorithmID   
authHandle 
  
B TPM_AUTHFAIL 
  
  C 
TPM_INVALID_AUTHHANDLE 
authLastNonceEven     
nonceOdd       
continueAuthSession       
pubAuth   B TPM_AUTHFAIL 
 
 
2.2  FSM-based Modelling Method 
 
Mealy machines and Moore machines are two types of finite state 
machines or finite automata. These are widely used to model 
finite state systems in different areas such as communication 
protocols and sequential circuits. 
 
Definition 1: a deterministic finite state machine (FSM) D is a 
six-tuple: 
 
D = (S, I, O, δ, λ, sinit ) where S, I , and O are finite and non-empty  
sets of states, input alphabet and output alphabet, sinit is the initial 
state, δ: SxI→S and λ:SxI→O are the functions of state transition 
and output, respectively. 
  The conformance of system implementation to the system 
specification can be tested by using FSM. This problem is called 
conformance testing or fault detection problem;3 at which two 
FSMs are given: a specification machine SPEC and 
implementation machine IMP. We can only observe the behavior 
of IMP that is a black box. 
  To test the conformance of an implementation under test 
IUT to its specification, it is needed to generate test cases from 
the SPEC model and then apply these test cases to the IUT. Test 
cases can be generated automatically from SPEC. A test case 
contains input and expected output. Therefore IUT conforms to 
its specification if it passes all the test cases. 
  TPM operational states, that are shown in Table 2, were 
modelled, and the commands of TPM based on deterministic 
finite state machine.4,5 There are four FSM models have been 
constructed which include the TPM operational states, TPM 
disabled-command suite, TPM deactivated-command suite and 
TPM unowned-command suite. 
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Table 2  TPM operational states 
 
State Enable/Disable Active/Inactive Owned/Unowned 
S1   Enable Active Owned 
S2 Disable Active Owned 
S3 Enable Inactive Owned 
S4 Disable Inactive Owned 
S5 Enable Active Unowned 
S6 Disable Active Unowned 
S7 Enable Inactive Unowned 
S8 Disable Inactive Unowned 
 
 
  We give an explanatory example for modelling TPM 
specifications based on FSM; Figure 3 shows the FSM model of 
the eight TPM operational states. This example is based on the 
reported methodology.4,5 The parameters of the FSM model are 
as follow: 
 
D0 = (S0, I0, O0, δ0, λ0, sinit0) 
S0 = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8} 
I0 = {TPM_OwnerSetDisable, TPM_PhysicalDisable, 
TPM_PhysicalSetDeactivated, TPM_SetTempDeactivated, 
TPM_OwnerClear, TPM_ForceClear, TPM_PhysicalEnable, 
TPM_TakeOwnership} 
O0= {S} where S means that the TPM successfully has executed 
the related command. 
sinit0= s5 
Bread-First Search has been used to generate test cases from D0. 
  Basically, FSM is used to model the control portions of 
system specification. This could be the main weakness of FSM as 
system specification normally contains data dependencies 
between the specification parts; which means that FSM is not 
powerful enough to model concrete systems in a concise way.3 
Consequently, FSM model may have issues such as state 
explosion as the number of states increases rapidly6 and FSM is 
not realistic in most practical situations.7 According to the TPM 
specification, majority of TPM’s commands are dependent on 
data from each other and a successful command execution may 
need other command(s) that have been successfully executed. 
Therefore, modeling the TPM specification using FSM, taking 
into account control and data dependencies between the 
commands, could result in impractically huge model and 
consequently having state explosion problem. Furthermore, the 
data dependency of the TPM’s commands should be tested to 
determine the behaviors of the TPM implementation. 
 
Figure 3  FSM model for the TPM’s operational states 
 
 
2.3  EFSM-based Modelling Method 
 
EFSM8 is generalization of FSM; i.e. EFSM is a traditional Mealy 
FSM extended with variables, predicates, and operations. 
Additionally, one main advantage of EFSM over FSM is that 
EFSM helps in reducing number of states. This advantage is 
because of the fact that EFSM is able to model the control flow 
of a system while its data flow is represented by variables, 
predicates, and operations. 
 
Definition 2: An EFSM is a six-tuple [6, 9] (S, s0, I, O, T, V) 
where S is a non-empty finite set of states, s0  S is the initial 
state, I and O are non-empty finite sets of input and output 
interactions, T is a non-empty finite set of transitions and  V is a  
non-empty  finite set of variables. t  T is a six-tuple (si, se, x, c, 
y) where si, se  S denote the initial and terminating states of t, 
respectively, x I is the input interaction of t, c is a logical 
expression representing a condition of t and expressed in terms of 
the variable of V, y  O is the output interaction of t. 
  EFSM-Based specification modelling was used in trusted 
computing16, where it is reported that the specifications of the 
Trusted Cryptography Module (TCM) were modelled by using 
EFSM. Firstly, the dependencies between the TCM commands 
were de-fined and, consequently, a dependency graph was drawn. 
Secondly, an EFSM model was constructed and test cases were 
generated for the EFSM model. The authors mentioned that the 
test case generation was not fully automatic. Finally, the TCM 
compliance testing was conducted in two layers, namely: 
command-level and function level. The former was used to test 
the TCM reliability, i.e. its behaviour when receive legal-
manipulated command message, as well as testing the TCM 
robustness where the behaviour of the TCM was tested by 
sending illegal-manipulated command message. In the latter, 
functionality test was conducted for testing the TCM functions. 
  To give an illustrative example of the EFSM modelling of 
the TPM specifications, Figure 4 shows EFSM model for a 
portion of the TPM specification, storage functions sub-module 
and some commands of the admin ownership module sub-
module. This example adopts the reported methodology. 16 The 
EFSM model was constructed based on the research work of and 
the TPM specification version 1.2, level 2 revision 116. As can 
be seen from Figure 4, the parameters of the EFSM model are as 
following: 
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S= {S1, S2, S3, S4}; 
s0= S1; 
I={ TPM_TakeOwnership, TPM_OwnerClear, 
TPM_ForceClear, TPM_DisableOwnerClear, 
TPM_DisableForceClear, TPM_Seal, TPM_Unseal, 
TPM_Unbind, TPM_CreateWrapKey, TPM_LoadKey2, 
TPM_GetPubKey, TPM_Sealx} 
O= {Create Owner, Clear Owner, Create Key, Disable 
ForceClear, Disable Owner-Clear, Load Key, Unseal, Seal, 
UnBind, Get PubKey} 
V= {Ownership Enabled, KeyLoaded, KeyExists, 
OwnerClearEnabled, ForceClearEnabled} 
There are 13 transitions where t1T is TPM_TakeOwnership 
[OwnershipEnabled]/ Create Owner. 
  The EFSM-Based specification modelling9 has made some 
improvement to the FSM-based modelling4,5 in modelling and 
generating test cases. However, it lacks the automatic generation 
of test cases. Furthermore, in order to use this method in TPM 
compliance testing it needs to involve the internal TPM data, such 
as flags, as variables to represent the relationship among the TPM 
commands. 
 
 
Figure 4  EFSM model for the storage functions and admin ownership sub-modules 
 
 
3.0  ATTACKS AGAINST TPM 
 
Although the main function of TPM chips is establishing trust and 
is to provide security services to their host platforms, many 
attacks have been performed against either the TPM chip itself or 
its environment, such as communication interface with the other 
platform's components. These attacks are either practical attack 
or security flaws that have been revealed by security analysis 
research work on the TPM specifications. Table 3 shows a 
collection of attacks against TPM and LPC bus (communication 
interface with other TP's components). 
 
Table 3  Attacks against the TPM by year 
 
Attack 
Year of the Attack 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 
Physical Attack       X   
Attacking TPM-Based architecture  
Against TXT      X     
Against BitLocker      X    
Dictionary Attack 
Online  X X       
Offline     X     
Replay Attack  X    X    
Attacking the TPM Communication Interface  (LPC Bus) 
Passive  X        
Reset X         
Violating the integrity of 
TPM commands 
   X    X X 
 
 
  The attacks, as shown in Table 3, vary from simple attacks 
to sophisticated attacks. For instance, in the reset attack,10 an 
attacker uses a small piece of wire in order to reset the TPM 
without resetting the whole TP. In other words, due to this attack 
the integrity values that represent the TP configuration and stored 
in TPM are changed to zeros. This violates the first design goal 
of TPM and breaks the remote attestation and sealing feature 
provided by the TPM. The passive attack is similar to the reset 
attack. Attackers can use inexpensive equipment to eavesdrop 
critical information from the LPC Bus.11 
  The Object-Independent Authorization Protocol (OIAP) is a 
TPM security protocol mainly intended to prevent replay attack.  
However, it was proved formally that OIAP has problem in its 
design which makes it vulnerable to replay attack.12,13 
Additionally, it is reported that the research work showed 
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formally an improper implementation of the OIAP which may 
lead to replay attack as well.13 
  TCG specification stated countermeasures against 
dictionary attacks, so TPM implementations contain protection 
mechanisms against dictionary attacks. Despite this protection, 
that mechanism was defeated.1 Furthermore, in certain 
circumstances offline dictionary attack against TPM is possible 
which may lead to other issues, for example, "to impersonate the 
TPM owner to the TPM, or the TPM to its owner".14 
  As a result of formal analysis on the TPM specifications, 
versions 1.1 and 1.2, it is reported that the integrity of the 
TPM_CertifyKey command can be violated due to a design 
problem in the Hash-Based Message Authentication Code 
(HMAC) calculation.15-17 
  The most sophisticated attack against TPM, so far, is the 
physical attack which was performed by Christopher 
Tranovsky.18 He was able to access TPM chips, by using electron 
microscope, from inside reaching the TPM data bus. So he was 
able to get any piece of information stored in the chip, such as 
cryptography keys. This means that the tamper-resist feature of 
TPM has been defeated. A worst case scenario could be, "not only 
is the data on individual chips at risk from this attack, once the 
manufacture's code is copied from the chip it could be used to 
produce counterfeit chips, which also could contain backdoors". 
19 
  In addition to the above mentioned attacks, both of 
BitLocker, an encryption feature provided by Microsoft 
Windows, and the Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) 
have been successfully attacked by Fraunhofer Institute for 
Information (SIT)20 and Invisible Things Lab (ITL)21 
respectively. 
  Although the results of the security analysis on the TPM 
specifications do play a crucial role in evaluating the quality of 
the TPM specifications and subsequently the security 
functionality provided by the TPM chips that implemented based 
on the specifications, to the best of our knowledge, none of the 
existing TPM testing frameworks1,4,5,22,23 has ever used these 
analysis results to evaluate the TPM under test.   
 
 
4.0  CONCLUSION 
 
Trusted computing (TC) is a promising technology for enhancing 
the security of computer systems and networks. TCG issued 
specifications for TC technology which is called TCG 
specifications. We emphasize on the TPM specifications. Based 
on past works it is discovered that there is a gap between some 
TPM implementations and the TPM specifications. This gap may 
cause the TPM component to fail in performing its security 
functionality and consequently may result in failing the security 
of its mounted system. Therefore, there is an urgent need to test 
the compliance of TPM implementation with reference to its 
specifications. In this paper, we report on some progress of the 
research works in the field of TPM testing have been achieved. 
The two major contributions of our work are on TPM compliance 
testing and security analysis on TPM specifications. In 
compliance testing of TPM, we presented the three modelling 
methods, namely, informal, FSM and EFSM. The main problem 
of these three methods is that there is a high possibility that it 
might cause state space explosion. Furthermore, the existing 
TPM compliance testing framework that we have referred to in 
the literature so far, conducted their tests based on test cases pre-
generated earlier. In other words, a complete test suite must first 
be derived completely before conducting the TPM compliance 
testing. This approach is referred to as batch-mode testing. 
Additionally, to our knowledge, none of the existing TPM testing 
frameworks has ever used the results of the TPM security analysis 
to evaluate the TPM implementations. 
  We can safely conclude that testing security devices such as 
TPM needs to be done systematically through automatically 
generated random test cases to increase the quality of testing. 
Moreover, automatic security testing has never been emphasized 
as a quality dimension in the exiting Framework for TPM 
Testing.  We have discussed and highlighted the urgent need to 
enhance the current TPM testing frameworks to achieve higher 
quality TPM testing.  
  For future work, we propose a new framework for TPM 
Testing that has several features. Firstly, it should have capacity 
to generate random test cases on-the-fly. This helps in alleviating 
the state space explosion problem and improves the quality of 
testing.  
  Secondly, it should posse other quality dimensions such as 
automatic security testing. Furthermore, it should be suitable for 
the TPM stakeholders such as normal TPM users who have 
abstract knowledge about TPM. 
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